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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
Case No. 20000517-CA 
JUAN QUITERIO PEREZ, Priority No. 2 (incarcerated) 
Defendant/Appellant. 
INTRODUCTION 
Current appellate counsel was appointed after the Legal Defenders 
Association conflicted out of the case. 
With the stipulation of counsel for the State, counsel has obtained the Court's 
permission to file a supplemental opening brief of appellant. 
Because the original opening brief of appellant appears to adequately state 
the case history, facts of the case, and argument, this brief will address the sole 
issue omitted from the opening brief by stating the issue, standard of review and 
preservation, by summarizing the argument, by presenting the argument, and by 
stating a conclusion. 
In all other respects, counsel relies on the original opening brief, and hereby 
reiterates all positions asserted therein. 
Once the State has had an opportunity to respond to the issue raised in this 
brief, counsel intends to file a reply brief replying to those of the State's arguments 
which require a reply. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
1. Did the trial court err in instructing the jury? 
This Court reviews the adequacy of jury instructions for correctness. See. 
e.g.. State v.Carruth. 947 P.2d 690,692 (Utah App. 1997), afTd, 1999 UT 107,993 
P.2d 869. 
This issue was not raised below, so Perez relies on the plain error and 
ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines. 
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error 
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the 
obviousness prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which 
is more obvious in hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g.. State 
v. Eldredae. 773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert, denied. 493 U.S. 814 (1989). 
Constitutional errors are particularly appropriate for correction under the plain 
error doctrine. See, e ^ , United States v. Lindsay. 184 F.3d 1138,1140 (10th Cir.), 
cert, denied. 145 LEd.2d 343 (1999). 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, counsel must demonstrate 
that trial counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable standards of 
representation, and that this objectively deficient performance was prejudicial. See 
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e.g. Parsons v.Barnes. 871 P.2d 516,521 (Utah), cert, denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994). 
The prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine requires proof 
of a reasonable probability of a different result in the absence of the objectively 
deficient performance. See e.g. State v. Lovell. 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The attempted murder conviction must be reversed because the trial court 
failed to instruct the jurors on the elements of attempt. 
Utah case law recognizes that this error impacts on the defendant's 
constitutional right to a jury's unanimous decision on each element of the offense, 
and constitutes plain error. 
Because trial counsel, like the trial court, should have recognized and raised 
this error, the error also constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
L 
THE ABSENCE OF AN ATTEMPT ELEMENTS INSTRUCTION 
REQUIRES REVERSAL OF THE ATTEMPTED MURDER CONVICTION. 
The jury convicted Mr. Perez of attempted murder, and the consecutive one 
to fifteen year prison sentence imposed by Judge Frederick was for the attempted 
murder conviction (R. 321, 332-333). 
There was no attempt elements instruction given to the jury (R. 282-317). The 
information instruction and the instruction stating the definition of attempted murder 
and the elements instruction for attempted murder all inserted the word attempt or 
-3-
attempted (R. 282, 304, 305, in Addendum 1 to this brief), but none of them stated 
the elements of attempt set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999). That statute 
provides, 
76-4-101. Attempt -- Elements of offense 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a 
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the 
commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial 
step toward commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step 
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise: 
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them 
to be. 
This absence of an accurate elements instruction requires reversal of the 
attempted murder conviction under basic Utah law. See, e.g.. State v. Jones. 823 
P.2d 1059,1061, (Utah 1980)("ln State v. Roberts. 711 P.2d 235 (Utah 1985), we 
stated, "The general rule is that an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of 
an offense is essential. Failure to so instruct constitutes reversible error." id. at 239 
(Utah 1985) (citing [State v.] Laine. 618 P.2d [33] at 35 [(Utah 1980)]). See also 
State v.Harmon. 712 P.2d 291,292 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); State v. Reedv. 681 
P.2d 1251, 1252 (Utah 1984)."). 
In reversing Perez's conviction on this point, this Court may rely on State v. 
Harmon, supra, which is very similar to this case. In Harmon, a per curiam opinion, 
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the court reversed a conviction for attempted robbery because the trial court there 
failed to instruct the jury on the elements of attempt, but instead merely inserted the 
word attempted into the robbery elements instruction. 712 P.2d at 291. The 
Harmon court found that the trial court's error was reversible, and did not even 
require Harmon to order a transcript of the proceedings for the appeal, because Utah 
law clearly requires a correct elements instruction to sustain a criminal conviction. 
Id- The court found that because the jury was not instructed on the elements of the 
crime, the court could not say that the jury properly convicted Harmon of each 
element of the offense, id- at 292. See also Constitution of Utah, Article I § 10 ("... 
In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous."); State v. Saunders. 1999 UT 59 
U 61, 992 P.2d 951, 967 (reversing conviction under Article I § 10 for absence of 
unanimity instruction in a case wherein the jurors may have convicted defendant on 
different factual theories, indicating that unanimity is necessary as to each element 
of an offense); Apprendi v. New Jersey. 530 U.S. 466 (2000)(requiring jury 
assessment of any issue which increases punishment). 
Likewise in the instant matter, the trial court did not instruct the jurors that 
Perez could not be convicted of attempted murder unless the prosecution proved he 
committed a substantial step which strongly corroborated his intent to murder, but 
simply inserted the word attempted into the general murder elements instruction. 
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Because trial counsel did not object to the absence of an attempt elements 
instruction,1 Perez relies on the plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel 
doctrines in addressing this issue for the first time on appeal. 
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error 
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the 
obviousness prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which 
is more obvious in hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g.. State 
v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert denied. 493 U.S. 814 (1989). 
Constitutional errors are particularly appropriate for correction under the plain 
error doctrine. See, e ^ , United States v. Lindsay. 184 F.3d 1138,1140 (10th Cir.), 
cert, denied. 145 LEd.2d 343 (1999). 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, counsel must demonstrate 
that trial counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable standards of 
representation, and that this objectively deficient performance was prejudicial. See 
e.g. Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d516,521 (Utah), certdenjed 513 U.S. 966 (1994). 
The prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine requires proof 
of a reasonable probability of a different result in the absence of the objectively 
deficient performance. See e.g. State v. Lovell. 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988). 
i 
Trial counsel's failure to object on the record might be attributable to Judge 
Frederick's having counsel discuss the jury instructions in an off the record meeting 
in chambers and then intemperately rushing counsel through his exceptions on the 
record. See R. 360 at 280-283, in Addendum 2 to this brief. 
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Utah courts recognize that the absence of an accurate elements instruction 
constitutes plain error impacting the defendant's constitutional rights to a unanimous 
jury verdict. See Jones: Laine. supra. Given that the error violates the defendant's 
constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict, correction of the error under the plain 
error doctrine continues to be particularly appropriate. See Lindsay, supra. 
On the basis of this law, trial counsel should have objected to the failure of the 
instructions to accurately state the elements of the offense charged, and the failure 
to do so was prejudicial because it deprived Perez of his right to a unanimous jury 
verdict. See Saunders, supra. 
The error was especially prejudicial in this case, wherein the jurors knew so 
little of the assailant's state of mind at the time of the offense in this case, given that 
the only evidence bearing on that was the injuries inflicted and the problematic 
testimony of the victim. On these facts, the jurors may well not have been able to 
reach a unanimous verdict on the issue of whether the defendant acted with the 
requisite specific intent to murder had they been properly instructed. See, generally. 
e.g.. State v. Bell. 785 P.2d 390, 393 (Utah 1989)(p/ura//Yy)(in the course of holding 
that there is no attempted felony murder under Utah law, the court discussed with 
approval various cases recognizing that attempted murder is a specific intent crime 
requiring proof of intent to kill). 
Because the jurors were not given an adequate elements instruction, the 
Court cannot say that they reached a unanimous verdict as to each element of the 
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offense, and a new trial is warranted on that count. See, e.g.. Harmon: Saunders. 
supra. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the attempted murder conviction and grant all relief 
sought in the original opening brief. 
DATED this ^ day of July, 2001. 
R. MCCAUGHEY 
Counsel for Mr. Perez 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY/MAILING 
I hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered/mailed, first class 
postage pre-paid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing to Assistant Attorney 
General Marian Decker, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114-0854 this day of July, 2001 
IEN R. MCCAUGHEY 
Counsel for Mr. Perez 
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Addendum 1 
FILED BiSTRJCT C9U8T 
Third Judicial District 
APR 19 2000 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUAN QUITERIO PEREZ, 
Defendant • 
i 
: INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
: CRIMINAL NO. 991919507 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
You are instructed that the defendant JUAN QUITERIO PEREZ is 
charged by the Information which has been duly filed with the 
commission of AGGRAVATED BURGLARY and ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL 
HOMICIDE. MURDER The Information alleges: 
COUNT I 
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, a First Degree Felony, at 533 West 
Tiffany Town Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about 
August 9, 1999, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 203, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, JUAN 
QUITERIO PEREZ, a party to the offense, entered or remained 
unlawfully in the dwelling of Ellen Kuhel with the intent to commit 
an assault, and caused bodily injury to Ellen Kuhel. 
COUNT II 
ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER, a Second Degree Felony, 
at 533 West Tiffany Town Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
on or about August 9, 1999, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Section 203, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, JUAN QUITERIO PEREZ, a party to the offense, attempted 
to intentionally or knowingly cause the death of Ellen Kuhel. 
00282 
INSTRUCTION NC ^ < 
Un d e r :^ v - ~ U t a i i •u" t e rip t e :i r,r: m i n a I 
Homicide constitutes Attempted Murder if the actor: 
(a) attempted to intentionally or knowingly cause the 
death ;:: another; 
or, 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury t i another 
comm11s an act ::] ear] \ Iangeroi is t: : 1 11 :man ] i fe that a11emptes to 
cause the death of another; 
or, •' 
(c) c :: t: i ng i inde r • : i r c i :ms tances evidencing a d e p r a ve d 
indifference to human. life engages in conduct \_1_1 ::-.- r- i 
grave risk of death to another and thereby attempts to cause the 
INSTRUCTION NO. SU> 
Before you can convict che defendant, JUAN Q. PEREZ, 
of the offense of A11 e mp t e d _riminaI Homo c i de, Murde i a s 
charged in count II of the information, you must find from ail 
of ihe evidence ani beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one 
of : i.e cv;_nj e _ emei 11s • Df 11 iat: Df f ei ise : 
: That on or about the 9th day of August, 1999, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, che defendant, JUAN Q.PEREZ, 
..-.-..L. _ - . . . t:I ie d e a t i i : 'f ELLEN KUHEL; and 
2. That said defendant then and chere did so: (a) 
intentionally or knowingly; :r b) intending to cause serious 
to human life, which act attempted t; cause the death of ELLEN 
KUHEL; or (c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
i n d ifferenc e c D i ruma n I i f e , h. e ] : n o v ;r: n J J y e n g age d :; n c o n d u c t 
which created a grave risk of death to another and which conduct 
attempted to cause the death of ELLEN KUHEL; and 
3 . That sa :i d defendant then and there did so unlawfully. 
I f after car e f u I z onsideration c f a 11 o f the evidence : n 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must f i n d t h e d e f e i i d a i 11 g u i 11 v : f A 1 1 e m p t e d C r i: : L i n a 1 
Komocide,Murder as charged in count II of the information. If, 
on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt :;f a i I \ : r i = : x: : i: t : i e i f tl ) e f t r e g o m g elements , triei i yoi i 
must find the defendant not guilty of count II. 
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* I MR. JOHNSON: 
5 nothing that proceeds .. .-;. we.., 
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THE COURT: Yea,
 y o u d i d # a n d t h a t ' s f i n e . 
JOHNSON: B o t h t h e A g g r a v a t e d B u r g l a r 
• •--• - - -
 av
" Now, l e t ' s b r i n g ,^ . i " 
) u n s e l . 
) 
'.Hi COURT: Please be seated. 
( J u a g e r e a a s i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e J u r y . ) 
THE COURT: Couri/n I || I |, , 
your c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t M. ; n n s o n ? 
'
nHNS ^ p r o x i m a t e l y an h o u r , . I in \qe, 
•— ~ ~ *-
 1
 ~ o t i f y - •"""*.? *-**?* *nir*.i.Lccs - f 
e x p i r a t i o n c i v o u : - . m e
 4 w U W i S i - -ww ^ ^ ^ „ _ „„ and 30? 
THE COURT: And, Mr. W i l l i a m s ? 
~ri& JuURT . o t i f y you l i k e w i s e i n two 
m i n u t e s . 
You may p r o c e e d , Mr, J o h n s o n . 
THE INTERPRETER. ^ r H o r _ c o u l d - - I n t e r p r e t e r 
1
 LumpK ^
 s t : . ^ - l u c t i o n 3 6 . 
THE COURT: No, j ou can continue with that as A) e 
THE INTERPRETER: -] -hen the Defendant will miss t 1 ie 
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